Hastings Law Journal
Volume 67 | Issue 6

Article 4

8-2016

Miranda Overseas: The Law of Coerced
Confessions Abroad
David Keenan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
David Keenan, Miranda Overseas: The Law of Coerced Confessions Abroad, 67 Hastings L.J. 1695 (2016).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol67/iss6/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Keenan-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete)

9/8/2016 4:29 PM

Miranda Overseas:
The Law of Coerced Confessions Abroad
David Keenan*
In recent years, Article III courts have become the preferred venue for the U.S.
government to try terrorism suspects captured abroad. Many liberals have welcomed this
development, characterizing it as a proper extension of American rule of law principles to
the so-called “War on Terror.” But while many have celebrated the marginalization of
the military tribunal system, few have directly acknowledged its potential costs.
This Article examines one of those costs: Reduced procedural safeguards for Article III
defendants against statements procured through coercive interrogation techniques. As
courts have repeatedly recognized, the core purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s SelfIncrimination Clause is to ensure that the accused is not compelled to testify against
himself in a criminal proceeding. More controversially, Miranda warnings give effect to
that purpose by requiring that any statements admitted into evidence be the product of a
suspect’s voluntary and informed choice.
However, where matters of national security are implicated, there is a danger that
prosecutions of extraterritorial crimes will cause our domestic courts to bend or abandon
traditional rules of American criminal procedure. That is particularly true with respect to
protections against self-incrimination. Through a comparison of current legal doctrine
with the Supreme Court’s pre-incorporation jurisprudence, this Article argues that courts
should be more, not less, vigilant in their review of confessions obtained abroad,
especially by regimes that are known to engage in torture. In practice, however, the
opposite has occurred. Foreign interrogation practices are subject to far fewer constraints
than domestic ones. That realization ought to give some pause to those who tout the
supposed virtues of our criminal justice system.
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Introduction
That terrorism suspects captured abroad enjoy fewer constitutional
rights than ordinary criminals is hardly a novel observation. Indeed,
much of the debate over the last decade has centered on whether they
1
should enjoy any constitutional rights at all. But it has become apparent
that Article III trials for those accused of terrorism-related offenses are
now the norm rather than the exception. The last prisoner transfer to
2
Guantanamo Bay occurred more than eight years ago, and the Obama
administration, like the Bush administration before it, has repeatedly
3
used Article III courts to prosecute suspected terrorists. In 2013,
President Obama reaffirmed his intention to close the Guantanamo
detention facility and transfer the individuals housed there to the United

1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (confirming, in a 5–4 decision, that
prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay enjoy the right of habeas corpus); Gerald L. Neuman,
Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2073, 2077
(2005) (arguing that terrorists enjoy constitutional rights under a “mutuality of obligation” approach to
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected
Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic? 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1975, 1975,
2047 (2009) (describing the Court’s effort to define the legal boundaries of the war on terror as
“quixotic,” and asserting that Boumediene “simply imposed the will of five Justices who disagreed
personally and politically with the government’s detainee policies”).
2. Human Rights First, Guantanamo by the Numbers 2 (2016) (reporting last known arrival
occurring on March 14, 2008).
3. N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Ctr. on Law & Sec., Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001–
September 11, 2011, 2 (2011) (documenting approximately 300 prosecutions of suspected terrorists
between September 11, 2001–September 11, 2011).
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States to stand trial. As such, the position that terrorism suspects are not
entitled to any rights under our Constitution no longer seems tenable.
While this development ought to be welcomed, it cannot be judged
in isolation. Scholars ought to question what is to be gained from
prosecuting terrorism suspects in Article III courts, particularly if those
prosecutions threaten to erode traditional procedural protections for
criminal defendants. The Bush administration pushed the boundaries of
legality so far that extraordinary departures from ordinary criminal
procedures now seem tame by comparison.
Perhaps those who are eager to prove the worthiness of Article III
courts believe it is possible to create a cabined “national security”
5
exception for terrorism prosecutions. I am less sanguine. Treating
terrorism suspects differently than ordinary criminals is itself an affront
to core constitutional principles of due process and equal protection. But,
the greater danger is that the law’s disparate treatment of terrorism
suspects becomes the exception that swallows the rule.
Rather than ask ourselves what might be gained from trying
suspects in Article III courts, we would be better served to consider what
is likely to be lost. To see why the danger of what some have termed
6
“seepage” is not merely hypothetical, it is necessary to understand the
nature of the criminal procedural rights enshrined in the Constitution.
Those rights are “transsubstantive” in that they apply equally to all
7
criminal suspects. For instance, the Fourth Amendment ordinarily
8
requires probable cause for searches and seizures. As one scholar has
noted, “that standard incorporates the entire criminal code without
9
differentiation.” Likewise, the Fifth Amendment’s right against self10
incrimination applies to “any criminal case.” Consequently, when courts
make law in terrorism cases, they are not just making law for terrorists.
What they say is equally applicable to suspected drug dealers, pimps,

4. Charlie Savage, Amid Hunger Strike, Obama Renews Push to Close Cuba Prison, N.Y. Times (Apr.
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/us/guantanamo-adds-medical-staff-amid-hunger-strike.html?
pagewanted=all.
5. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Terrorism Prosecutions in U.S. Federal Court: Exceptions to
Constitutional Evidence Rules and the Development of a Cabined Exception for Coerced Confessions,
4 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 58 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali,
88 Tex. L. Rev. 1501, 1501 (2010).
7. William J. Stuntz, Essay, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002).
8. Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.1(a) (5th
ed. 2013).
9. Stuntz, supra note 7, at 2140 n.7.
10. U.S. Const. amend V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, . . .”).
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antitrust violators, fraudsters, child pornographers, and immigration
11
offenders.
It is not easy, in other words, to divorce terrorism cases from our
criminal procedure writ large. Both the amorphous nature of terrorism
offensespredicated on ordinary criminal acts like murder or even
noncriminal acts such as the provision of goods and servicesand the
nature of our constitutional discourse, which presupposes that the scope
of constitutional rights remains uniform and relatively fixed, would serve
to defeat any such effort. When courts expound on the scope of Miranda
protections overseas or the admissibility of evidence obtained without a
search warrant, they are necessarily speaking not only of the rights of
terrorists, but of the rights of all criminal suspects abroad. That latter
category, as Justice Brennan presciently warned more than twenty-five
years ago, is likely to grow ever larger as the United States seeks new
12
ways to apply its laws overseas.
This Article tackles one threat that the current legal regime for
Article III terrorism prosecutions poses to our core constitutional values:
its lack of safeguards against coerced confessions. As courts have
repeatedly recognized, the central purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s
Self-Incrimination Clause is to ensure that the accused is not compelled
13
to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding. More
controversially, Miranda warnings give expression to that right by
requiring that any statements admitted into evidence be the product of a
14
suspect’s knowing and voluntary choice.
Together, the Fifth Amendment and Miranda can be thought of as
serving three basic values. First, they increase the probability that a
15
confession offered into evidence is reliable. Second, they deter abusive
police practices by preventing the use of illegally obtained confessions to
16
prove guilt. And third, they protect the autonomy of the individual
subjected to the psychological pressures of custodial interrogation by
17
giving her a choice as to whether she shall speak or remain silent.

11. Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair
the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 81, 103–04 (2003) (“The historical
record of the ‘drug exception’ and/or the ‘organized crime exception’ swallowing the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments is reason enough to beware the ‘leaching factor’ that may attend the changes
terrorism cases have wrought.”).
12. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 280 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Foreign
nationals must now take care not to violate our drug laws, our antitrust laws, our securities laws, and a
host of other federal criminal statutes.”).
13. Id. at 264 (characterizing the right against self-incrimination as a “fundamental trial right of
criminal defendants”).
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
15. See generally Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936); Hopt v. Utah, 373 U.S. 503,
508–11 (1884) (discussing situations where Miranda bolsters the probability that confessions are reliable).
16. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941).
17. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 507 (1963).
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These values should be no different whether the stationhouse is a
foreign or domestic one. If anything, one might suspect that courts would
be more skeptical of confessions obtained abroad, especially by regimes
that are known to engage in torture. But precisely the opposite has
occurred. Foreign interrogation practices are subject to far fewer
18
constraints than domestic ones. Whereas scholars have previously
assumed that statements obtained by torture cannot be admitted in U.S.
courts, that assumption is now open to question as courts have, in recent
years, admitted statements of terrorism suspects (or evidence derived
19
therefrom) notwithstanding claims of torture. Moreover, executive
agencies have concocted elaborate techniques for circumventing
Miranda, some of which have been blessed by Article III courts. Such
tactics include posing questions through foreign interrogators without the
20
benefit of Miranda warnings, engaging in two-step interrogation
techniques in which those warnings are purposefully omitted from initial
21
“intelligence only” interrogations, and recasting the public safety
exception to allow for broad questioning regarding any and all terrorist
22
Although this Article’s focus is on extraterritorial
threats.
interrogations, it is worth noting that these tactics have begun to make
23
inroads into the domestic sphere as well.
This Article is divided into three Parts. In Part I, I explain how the
Supreme Court’s pre-incorporation jurisprudence has much to teach us
18. See infra Part II.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmed, 94 F. Supp. 3d 394, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), reconsideration
denied, No. 12-CR-661 (SLT)(S-2), 2015 WL 1636827 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015) (declining to hold “taint”
hearing despite defendants’ unchallenged assertion that they were tortured while in Djiboutian custody,
and where the government agreed not to seek admission at trial of any statements obtained by U.S. or
Djiboutian officials); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 234 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding district court’s
decision to admit statements of terrorism suspect who claimed to have been tortured by Saudi officials);
United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (admitting statements of Palestinian
terrorism suspect notwithstanding claims of torture at hands of Israeli officials). But see United States v.
Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (refusing to permit witness testimony where
government’s knowledge of witness’s identity was a fruit of defendant’s torture).
20. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 225.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. See Memorandum from the Acting Deputy Att’y Gen. on Custodial Interrogations and
Intelligence-Gathering for Operational Terrorists Arrested Inside the United States (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-memo-ciot.pdf.
23. Witness the prosecutions of Times Square would-be bomber Faisal Shazhad, the “underwear
bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and most recently, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Emily Bazelon has provided
a succinct description of the current state of the law in a 2013 Slate article. See Emily Bazelon, Why Should I
Care That No One’s Reading Dzhokhar Tsarnaev His Miranda Rights?, Slate (Apr. 19, 2013, 11:29 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/04/dzhokhar_tsarnaev_and_miranda_rig
hts_the_public_safety_exception_and_terrorism.html; see also United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 1020005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011) (admitting statements of terrorism
suspect under the so-called “public-safety exception” notwithstanding that suspect “suffered third
degree burns to his lower extremities, was transported to the hospital, was given 350 micrograms of
fentanyl, and then interrogated for approximately 50 minutes by federal agents while he was in the
burn care unit”).
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about the current legal complexities regarding confessions obtained
abroad. Specifically, I describe the voluntariness standard courts
formerly applied to confessions obtained by state law enforcement
agencies. I also examine the pre-incorporation “silver platter” doctrine
that allowed federal courts to admit evidence seized by states in
contravention of Fourth Amendment principles so long as federal
24
officials neither directed nor participated in the search. Although these
doctrines seem antiquated, they are actually highly relevant to assessing
the admissibility of statements obtained abroad.
Parts II and III focus on the particular dilemmas raised by overseas
interrogations. Part II begins with a brief discussion of Miranda and its
aftermath. My aim is to show that Miranda embodies a constitutional,
rather than merely prophylactic, rule. That is to say, contrary to the
decision’s critics, Miranda does not “sweep[] more broadly than the Fifth
25
Amendment itself.” Instead, it is better understood as recognizing
custodial interrogations for the inherently compulsive environments that
26
they are. Accordingly, under Miranda’s logic, extracting statements in
such settings without the benefit of warnings runs afoul of the SelfIncrimination Clause. Only a valid waiver can make a custodial
interrogation constitutional by ensuring that either a criminal suspect has
voluntarily submitted to its compulsive forces, or that the coercive
27
atmosphere has itself dissipated.
Courts typically approach statements obtained by foreign governments
very differently. Such statements are not subject to Miranda’s protections at
all, but are instead judged according to the older, pre-incorporation
28
voluntariness standard. Overseas interrogations by U.S. law enforcement,
29
by contrast, are subject to Miranda, albeit in modified form. As Part III
explains, taken together, these doctrines create a perverse incentive that
encourages U.S. officials to use foreign governments in order to circumvent
Miranda’s requirements. But even where U.S. officials choose to conduct an
interrogation themselves, we should be skeptical that Miranda provides any
meaningful restraint on their actions. That is because an increasingly
common technique of “two-step” interrogations has evolved, whereby an
initial “dirty” un-Mirandized interrogation, supposedly conducted for
intelligence purposes only, is followed by a Mirandized interrogation
intended to “cleanse” the statements of their earlier taint so they can be

24. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1949).
25. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 702 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)).
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (“Unless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” (emphasis added)).
27. Id.
28. See infra Part II.
29. Id.
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admitted at trial. Moreover, the government’s broadened view of the
“public safety” exception purports to allow it to use even those
31
statements that are unwarned.
All of these practices have become commonplace in the last decade.
As a consequence, Fifth Amendment protections for terrorism suspects
have been severely diminished. For those inclined to think in cost-benefit
terms, courts’ willingness to countenance false positives in terrorism
investigations might be welcomed as a logical reflection of terrorism’s
severity. But even if one accepts this sliding-scale approach to
constitutional rights, the lack of a limiting principle should be troubling.
And while the tactics used in terrorism cases have yet to be deployed
regularly in ordinary criminal investigations, the likelihood of that
happening increases substantially with each passing judicial opinion
sanctifying their use. The pressure for courts to approve such techniques
will only intensify as the Obama administration seeks to try more
suspects in domestic courts. This realization ought to give proponents of
Article III courts some pause before touting the supposed virtues of our
criminal justice system.
I. The Law of Coerced Confessions Before MIRANDA
A. The Pre-Incorporation Voluntariness Standard
Those who supported the Self-Incrimination Clause’s inclusion in
the Bill of Rights saw it as embodying a long-standing Anglo-American
tradition prohibiting the admission of statements procured through
32
torture. At first glance, then, it is puzzling that the Supreme Court for
much of its history analyzed the admissibility of confessions under the
33
Due Process Clause. The solution only begins to reveal itself when one
realizes that the Self-Incrimination Clause was not incorporated against

30. See Defendant Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed’s Post-Hearing Memorandum in Support of His Motion
to Suppress Post-Arrest Statements at 44–65, United States v. Ahmed, No. 10-cr-131, 2012 WL 1805050
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012) (discussing that the two-step interrogation technique apparently evolved in the late
1990s to deal specifically with terrorism investigations); see Roberto Suro, FBI’s ‘Clean’ Teams Follow ‘Dirty’
Spy Work, Wash. Post (Aug. 16, 1993), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/aug99/
dirty16.htm; Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, The New
Yorker, Feb. 15, 2010, at 52 (discussing how a “clean team” was used with the aim of allowing the U.S.
government to use Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s statements against him in federal court, though the Obama
administration’s efforts to do so were eventually frustrated by congressional republicans).
31. Memorandum from the Acting Deputy Att’y Gen. on Custodial Interrogations, supra note 22.
32. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 865 n.20 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Aschcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154–55 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 285–87 (1936).
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the states until 1964 and was generally thought to apply to in-court
34
proceedings only.
Although the drafting history of the Fifth Amendment’s Self35
Incrimination Clause is surprisingly “sparse and ambiguous,” two
related but distinct rationales seem to have provided the impetus behind
its ratification. One was a common law rule that excluded coerced
36
confessions on the basis of their apparent unreliability. The other was a
rule that acknowledged individual autonomy by prohibiting courts from
compelling witnesses to testify under oath by threatening them with
37
contempt. In an 1897 decision, Bram v. United States, the Supreme
38
Court found both values embodied in the Self-Incrimination Clause.
The question before the Court in Bram was whether a law enforcement
officer’s implicit threat to imprison a suspect until he submitted to
39
interrogation constituted compulsion under the Fifth Amendment. The
Court found that it did, and therefore, the officers could not use Bram’s
statements against him because they “must necessarily have been the
40
result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on the mind.” Bram,
however, had virtually no effect on the law of coerced confessions prior
41
to Miranda. For the next sixty plus years, the Supreme Court opted to
review both state and federal confessions through a due process
42
framework instead. This approach reflected the Court’s belief, contrary
to Bram, that the Self-Incrimination Clause only prohibited compelled
in-court testimony and, therefore, did not apply to statements made
43
during custodial interrogations.
34. See generally Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that “the Fifth Amendment’s exception
from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from abridgment by the
states”).
35. Ronald J. Allen, Essay, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 71, 73 (2006).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 73–74.
38. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543–49 (1897).
39. Id. at 562 (“It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in which the accused was when
the statement was made to him that the other suspected person had charged him with crime, the result
was to produce upon his mind the fear that, if he remained silent, it would be considered an admission
of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty person; and it cannot
be conceived that the converse impression would not also have naturally arisen that, by denying, there
was hope of removing the suspicion from himself.”).
40. Id.
41. Allen, supra note 35, at 74.
42. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 210 (1960); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561
(1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957); Aschcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154–55 (1944);
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228–29 (1940); White v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 530–31 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–87 (1936).
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 510 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Historically, the privilege
against self-incrimination did not bear at all on the use of extra-legal confessions, for which distinct
standards evolved; indeed, ‘the history of the two principles is wide apart, differing by one hundred years
in origin, and derived through separate lines of precedents.’” (citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2266, at
401 (McNaughton rev. 1961))).
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When it came to reviewing the actions of state officials prior to the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, the Supreme Court
could rely on neither the Self-Incrimination Clause nor its inherent
supervisory powers over lower federal courts to invalidate confessions.
The Court, however, frequently found itself confronted with instances of
abhorrent state behavior. Nowhere was the conduct more egregious than
44
in the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi. The appellants in Brown were
black tenant farmers who confessed to murder only after police officers,
with the assistance of a white mob, hanged and whipped one of the
45
defendants until he confessed. The State argued that the trial court’s
decision to admit the confession was immune from attack because the
sole protection against coerced confessions was the Self-Incrimination
Clause, which only constrained federal officials and only applied to in46
court witness testimony. The Court’s Justices, understandably appalled
by the facts before them, unanimously rejected Mississippi’s argument.
In so doing, they distinguished “[c]ompulsion by torture to extort a
confession” from the sort of nonphysical, in-court compulsion thought at
47
the time to be the object of the Self-Incrimination Clause. Although the
state was free to regulate its court process however it saw fit, it could not
48
dispense with “due process of law.” Even if the State was within its
rights to radically depart from traditional procedure by, say, abolishing
the jury, it could not “substitute trial by ordeal” in its place or rely on the
49
“rack and torture chamber” in place of the witness stand. Brown
marked the beginning of an era in which the Court began reviewing state
confessions by invoking a “voluntariness” standard embedded in
50
fundamental notions of due process.

44. See Brown, 297 U.S. 278, 279–80.
45. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Extraterritorial Interrogation: The Porous Border Between Torture
and U.S. Criminal Trials, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 647, 660 (2008).
46. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 285–86.
50. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (“While Bram was decided before Brown
and its progeny, for the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced
confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied the due process voluntariness
test in ‘some 30 different cases decided during the era that intervened between Brown and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 [(1964)].’” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 223 (1973)).
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Voluntariness, however, proved to be a concept more easily defined
in theory than in practice. The Court in Culombe v. Connecticut provided
a succinct, if not particularly helpful, “test” for voluntariness:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends
51
due process.

But as the more than thirty Supreme Court opinions issued between
Brown and Miranda attest, the Court had great difficulty reaching a
consensus on what kinds of practices were sufficient to render a confession
52
involuntary. Justice Frankfurter, for his part, felt compelled to
53
acknowledge that “[t]he notion of ‘voluntariness’ is itself an amphibian.”
The Court elaborated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:
Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks
capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statementseven those
made under brutal treatmentare “voluntary” in the sense of
representing a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if “voluntariness”
incorporates notions of “butfor” [sic] cause, the question should be
whether the statement would have been made even absent inquiry or
other official action. Under such a test, virtually no statement would be
voluntary because very few people give incriminating statements in the
54
absence of official action of some kind.

Faced with these two extremes, the Court opted for a middle ground
approach in which it balanced the autonomy interests of individuals and
general notions of fairness against law enforcement’s need for
information. The laundry list of relevant factors the Court used to gauge
voluntarinessthe length of the detention; whether the suspect had been
advised of any of his constitutional rights; the accused’s age, intelligence,
and education level; the circumstances of the questioning, including
threats of physical punishment; deprivation of food or sleep; etc.rarely
produced agreement between the Court’s liberal and conservative
55
members. Perhaps that lack of consensus is why the Court never

51. Culombe v. Connecticute, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
52. Id. at 601 (“In light of our past opinions and in light of the wide divergence of views which
men may reasonably maintain concerning the propriety of various police investigative procedures not
involving the employment of obvious brutality, this much seems certain: It is impossible for this Court,
in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt precisely to delimit, or to surround with specific,
all-inclusive restrictions, the power of interrogation allowed to state law enforcement officers in
obtaining confessions.”).
53. Id. at 605.
54. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224 (quoting Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention,
Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 Colum.
L. Rev. 62, 72–73 (1966)).
55. M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism,
12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 319, 337 (2003) (noting that while the “Brown decision was unanimous,”
the Court’s later opinions evidenced “a deeply fractured Court”).
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developed a clear formula for assessing the relative weight of the test’s
various inputs.
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, for instance, the Court held by a 6–3 vote
that a confession was the result of a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause when it was procured primarily
56
through psychological, rather than physical, compulsion. The suspect in
Ashcraft had been held “incommunicado, without sleep or rest” for
thirty-six hours following his arrest, at the end of which “relays of
officers, experienced investigators, and highly trained lawyers questioned
57
him without respite.” Such a process, according to the Court, appeared
“so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the
possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full
58
coercive force is brought to bear.” But to the dissenters, on whose
behalf Justice Jackson wrote, the majority’s approach amounted to
deeming a confession unconstitutional merely because the process by
which it was obtained consisted of “conduct which we may personally
59
disapprove.” To avoid such value-driven judgments, Justice Jackson
would have drawn a bright line between physical abuse and the kind of
mental coercion he viewed to be an inherent (and acceptable) aspect of
police interrogation. Moreover, Justice Jackson warned that “the
principles by which we may adjudge when [police questioning] passes
constitutional limits are quite different from those that condemn police
60
brutality, and are far more difficult to apply.”
Notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s reservations, the Court took a
further step towards invalidating psychological pressure tactics in Spano
61
v. New York. There, it found a due process violation when the police
ignored a suspect’s persistent refusal to submit to interrogation as well as
his repeated requests to speak with counsel over an eight-hour
62
interrogation session. The suspect only confessed after his childhood
friend, then a cadet at the police academy, falsely told the suspect that he
63
had gotten the friend “in a lot of trouble.” Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Warren explained that the Court’s decision was not merely
64
a reflection of the “inherent untrustworthiness” of such confessions, but
also the “deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while
65
enforcing the law.” While acknowledging that the Court had not been

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Aschcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944).
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 158 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 160.
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 320.
Id.
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presented with interrogations involving physical brutality since Brown,
Chief Justice Warren noted that the more “sophisticated” methods used
to obtain confessions made the Court’s “duty to enforce federal
constitutional protections” more difficult and invited “more delicate
66
judgments to be made.” In placing the emphasis on the suspect’s
67
overborne will, the Court showed more concern for the individual’s
right to choose whether to confess than it did for the reliability of the
68
confession itself.
The logical next step was for the Court to conclude, as it did in
Miranda, that custodial interrogations are constitutionally problematic
because their inherent coerciveness compels suspects to speak against
69
their will. Accordingly, the proper rubric for analyzing coerced
confessions became the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause
rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
70
Amendments. Incorporation, of course, made such a move practically
feasible. As is argued further in Part II, Miranda is best understood as
recognizing a constitutional rule, not inventing a prophylactic one, as its
detractors often claim. That is because Miranda interpreted the SelfIncrimination Clause as affording criminal suspects the right to be free
from custodial interrogation. Like most other constitutional rights, this
71
“right to remain silent” is waivable by the individual. Hence, law
enforcement is not prohibited from conducting interrogations full stop,
but they must simply obtain an individual’s consent before proceeding to
do so. Statistical studies indicate that roughly eighty percent of criminal
72
suspects submit to interrogation voluntarily.
Although the Miranda warning/waiver framework has replaced the
voluntariness test for domestic criminal interrogations, the latter is not
entirely obsolete. In addition to overseas interrogations by foreign
governments, the voluntariness inquiry continues to guide courts’
analysis in two important areas. First, Miranda waivers themselves have
predictably given rise to allegations of coercion. Accordingly, courts
continue to employ the voluntariness test in determining whether
73
waivers were validly executed. Second, in the Fourth Amendment
context, questions often arise as to whether a search of a suspect’s person

66. Id. at 321.
67. Id. at 323.
68. Id. at 320.
69. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
70. Id. at 459.
71. See generally Alfred Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 Colum.
L. Rev. 1050, 1055 (1978) (discussing the forfeitures that arise from procedural defaults in the
assertion of constitutional rights in criminal cases).
72. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of
the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839, 868 (1996).
73. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
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or property was consensual. In 1973, the Burger Court rejected the
74
invitation to extend Miranda’s rationale to such searches. Consequently,
officers need not issue any warnings prior to asking for consent to search
one’s person or property. Instead, courts look to the traditional
voluntariness test to judge whether such consent was obtained free of
undue coercion.
The voluntariness test is obviously weaker than the bright-line rule
laid down in Miranda. Indeed, one suspects this is why the Burger Court
favored its adoption in the search context over the objections of the
75
Court’s more liberal members. Because it invites courts to engage in a
balancing of variables, the inclusion and relative weight of which are
both easily manipulated, determinations of admissibility are likely to
reflect judges’ preexisting policy preferences.
As Part II explains, this is problematic in the coerced confessions
context because judges are likely to favor wide latitude for government
actors seeking to prevent future terrorist attacks. Indeed, there are
already voices in the academy complaining that the voluntariness
standard is too stringent and will handicap legitimate law enforcement
efforts. UCLA Professor Norman Abrams, for instance, has remarked
that the Court’s voluntariness doctrine “appears to bar the police from
using a number of techniques and practices in ordinary crime cases that
76
do not approach an ‘extremely cruel’ standard, or even a cruel method.”
He goes on to argue that “[t]he use of such non-extreme techniques to
ferret out information, while violating standards of how we want the
police to behave in ordinary criminal cases, should not be prohibited
when there is exigency and the interrogation is directed to obtaining
77
intelligence to prevent terrorism actions.”
Abrams’ argument, that terrorism suspects can, or ought to be,
treated differently, finds little support in the Constitution. But, there is
undeniable merit to his observation that, in the absence of a cabined
exception for terrorism cases, ad hoc judicial lawmaking under a
78
voluntariness standard will lead courts to stretch preexisting doctrine.
Indeed, as this Article argues in Parts II and III, several courts have
already done just that.

74. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
75. Accord Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 241 (1983) (“At the doctrinal level, Burger
Court decisions that have relaxed the ‘waiver’ standard for fourth and fifth amendment rights reflect
this crime control theme. The Court has slighted concerns about whether the individual intelligently
relinquished these rights by refusing to give them any dispositive weight.”).
76. Abrams, supra note 5, at 92–93.
77. Id. at 93.
78. Id. at 112–13.
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B. Information-Sharing Between Sovereigns: The Origins of
the “Joint Venture” Doctrine
The joint venture doctrine is another remnant of pre-incorporation
law whose relevance has been resuscitated by the legal complexities
arising from the war on terrorism. Although originally invented to deal
with problems arising out of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches, its rationale is equally applicable to the modern
Fifth Amendment law of overseas confessions. Regrettably, courts have
yet to apply the lessons of this pre-incorporation doctrine to
contemporary joint investigations between the United States and foreign
nations. As Part III suggests, that failure is likely a reflection of judicial
policy preferences. The joint venture doctrine as it existed during the
Prohibition was designed to elicit adherence to the Constitution. In
contrast, courts in terrorism prosecutions have expressed a preference
for encouraging cooperation between the United States and foreign
79
governments by freeing law enforcement from constitutional restraints.
As was true of confessions law, prior to incorporation, state officials
were not subject to the constitutional limitations of the Fourth
Amendment. In fact, the Court had explicitly rejected efforts to
incorporate the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule against the
80
81
states until it reversed course in 1961 when it decided Mapp v. Ohio.
But, unlike pre-incorporation confessions law, in which the same due
process standard governed both federal and state interrogations,
searches and seizures by federal and state authorities were judged by
different measures. This created a host of problems for courts tasked
with interpreting the legality of joint state-federal operations. The
obvious concern was that federal law enforcement would have state
officials do their bidding for them in order to circumvent constitutional
82
safeguards.
The problem became most pronounced during Prohibition. State
and federal officials would often work together investigating organized
criminal enterprises involved in alcohol smuggling and a host of other
criminal activity that was primarily local in character. Consequently,
issues frequently arose over whether to admit evidence obtained by state
officers where the methods those officers employed, while perhaps legal

79. See infra Part II.A.
80. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
81. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Falloco, 277 F. 75, 81–82 (W.D. Mo. 1922) (noting that “the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is not directed to individual conduct of state
officials,” but suppressing evidence where “there were conferences between state and federal authorities”
that “were held with a view to a closer co-operation between the two jurisdictions in the enforcement of
the prohibitory law” and where the state-federal cooperation was “systematic and frictionless”).
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under state law, offended Fourth Amendment notions of reasonableness.
In making those determinations, the Court had to decide whether the
level of federal involvement was enough to convert the operation into a
joint venture subject to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and
particularity requirements. Put differently, did any federal participation
render the Fourth Amendment applicable, or did state actors have to act
as the federal government’s agents?
The Court first excluded evidence obtained as the result of a joint
venture in 1927. Byars v. United States was a case in which local officials
obtained a valid state law search warrant, but one that would have run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment, both because it failed to establish
probable cause, and because it lacked a particularized description of the
84
items to be seized. The joint venture problem arose when local officials,
after first obtaining the warrant from a municipal judge, invited a federal
85
agent to participate in the search. As was true of many joint venture
cases from the period, Byars involved an investigation into alcohol
offenses. The federal Prohibition agent who accompanied the local
officials on the search acknowledged that he “had no authority for going
into the house other than the search warrant that the officers had secured
86
from the state authorities.” The search resulted in the discovery of
counterfeit strip stamps used on bottled-in-bond whiskey, evidence
87
federal prosecutors subsequently used to convict Byars.
Writing on behalf of a unanimous Court, Justice Sutherland deemed
the search illegal and reversed Byars’ conviction. He explained that while
“mere participation” by a federal officer in a state search “does not
render it a federal undertaking,” such participation does require the
Court to “scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand
to prevent violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect
88
methods.” In the instant case, the Court found that the federal agent
had participated “upon the chance, which was subsequently realized, that
89
something would be disclosed of official interest to him as such agent.”
Moreover, the state official had invited the federal official to join him, as
opposed to a fellow local officer, precisely because he suspected they
90
would uncover evidence of federal criminal wrongdoing. Indeed, the

83. Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, Coordinated Criminal Investigations Between the United
States and Foreign Governments and Their Implications for American Constitutional Rights, 42 Va. J.
Int’l L. 821, 823 (2002).
84. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (“The warrant clearly is bad if tested by the
Fourth Amendment and the laws of the United States.”).
85. Id. at 29, 30–31.
86. Id. at 31.
87. Id. at 29.
88. Id. at 32.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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federal officer took possession of all evidence seized and held it in his
91
exclusive possession. Given these facts, the Court concluded that the
federal official participated “under color of his federal office,” thereby
rendering the search “in substance and effect . . . a joint operation of the
92
local and federal officers.”
The Court decided another joint venture case involving alcohol
93
offenses that same year, in Gambino v. United States. In Gambino, New
York state troopers stopped the defendants’ car at the Canadian border
without a search warrant and seized liquor, which they subsequently
94
turned over to federal officials. The Gambino Court framed the
question as “whether, although the state troopers were not agents of the
United States, their relation to the federal prosecution was such as to
95
require the exclusion of the evidence wrongfully obtained.”
Recognizing that no federal officials participated directly in the search
itself, the Court nonetheless deemed the evidence inadmissible. In doing
so, it emphasized that the “sole” purpose of the stop was to aid federal
96
officials in the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act. The state
troopers had no valid basis for the seizure or subsequent search under
state law, but rather, felt bound to aid in the enforcement of the
97
Prohibition Act. While acknowledging that the troopers did not “act[]
under the directions of the federal officials in making the arrest and
seizure,” the Court held that “the rights guaranteed by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments may be invaded as effectively by such co-operation as
98
by the state officers acting under direction of federal officials.”
Consequently, the evidence seized should not have been admitted in the
defendants’ federal trial because the state officers had lacked probable
cause as required by the Fourth Amendment.
Byars and Gambino combined to form a robust barrier to the
admission in federal trials of evidence seized in contravention of the
Fourth Amendment. Read together, the cases mandated exclusion
whenever either a federal official had participated in the search or state
officials had conducted the search with the sole purpose of aiding the
99
enforcement of federal law.
The Court went a step further in Lustig v. United States by creating a
bright-line rule against admission whenever a federal official “had a hand

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Nathan & Man, supra note 83, at 828.
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100

in” the search. Justice Frankfurter’s plurality opinion explained what
came to be known as the “silver platter doctrine”:
The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if
he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to federal authorities on a silver
platter. The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars
case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of
101
securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means.

In Lustig, the Court concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation
had occurred where a Secret Service agent had observed suspicious activity
through the keyhole of a suspect’s hotel room and tipped off state
102
officials. After obtaining a local search warrant, those officials invited the
agent to help inventory the contents of the room, which included evidence
103
later used to convict the suspect of federal counterfeiting violations.
Later, in Elkins v. United States, decided in 1960, explicitly overruled
the silver platter doctrine of Lustig, but left intact the jurisprudence that
104
had preceded it. While those earlier cases may have produced a rule that
105
was “difficult and unpredictable,” the silver platter doctrine went too far
in encouraging federal officials to turn a blind eye to behavior that was
offensive to constitutional principles. The Court explained:
Free and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement
officers is to be commended and encouraged. Yet that kind of cooperation
is hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal officers to
withdraw from such association and at least tacitly to encourage state
officers in the disregard of constitutionally protected freedom. If, on the
other hand, it is understood that the fruit of an unlawful search by state
agents will be inadmissible in a federal trial, there can be no inducement to
subterfuge and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in
criminal investigation. Instead, forthright cooperation under constitutional
106
standards will be promoted and fostered.

Between Lustig and Elkins, the Court had determined that the
Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, but declined to adopt the exclusionary rule as a
107
constitutionally mandated remedy. The Elkins Court, therefore, relied
on its supervisory power over lower federal courts to repudiate the silver
108
platter doctrine.

100. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949).
101. Id. at 78–79.
102. Id. at 76, 79–80.
103. Id. at 76–77.
104. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223–24 (1960).
105. Id. at 212.
106. Id. at 221–22.
107. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
108. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 216 (“What is here invoked is the Court’s supervisory power over the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, under which the Court has ‘from the very

Keenan-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete)

1712

9/8/2016 4:29 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1695

Elkins’ relevance to domestic investigations turned out to be shortlived. Scarcely a year after the opinion was issued, the Court decided in
Mapp v. Ohio that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally mandated
109
in both state and federal proceedings.
The joint venture doctrine’s usefulness lives on, however, in the
context of foreign interrogations. Although the Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the issue, several lower courts have described
international investigations between the United States and foreign
governments as joint ventures that may, under certain conditions,
110
With respect to the Fourth
implicate constitutional protections.
Amendment, the international joint venture doctrine has lost much of its
importance given the Court’s holding in United States v. VerdugoUrquidez: That foreign nationals do not enjoy Fourth Amendment
protections in their persons or possessions outside the United States,
even when the United States is the relevant government actor directing
111
the investigation. The Fifth Amendment, however, is a different matter
altogether. Significantly, it applies to all “persons” as opposed to “the
112
people.” Perhaps more importantly, as the Verdugo-Urquidez majority
recognized, the Self-Incrimination Clause has been interpreted as
113
primarily a trial right, meaning violations of the clause occur at the
114
time the government seeks to introduce the statements into evidence.
Consequently, a statement may be deemed compelled regardless of
where its words are spoken.
But, because statements obtained by foreign governments are not
subject to Miranda and are instead adjudged according to the lower
voluntariness standard described above, the locus of a statement’s
recording actually matters a great deal in practice. In the absence of a
robust international joint venture doctrine, U.S. officials are incentivized

beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions.’”
(citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943))).
109. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Vilar,
No. S305-cr-621 KMK, 2007 WL 1075041 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007); United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d
57, 61 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Heller,
625 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978); Cranford v.
Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860, 863–64 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Dopf, 434 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1970).
111. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990).
112. Compare U.S. Const. amend. V, with U.S. Const. amend. IV (distinguishing between
“persons” in the Fifth Amendment and “people” in the Fourth Amendment).
113. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (“The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.”).
114. Id. (“Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that
right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.” (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453
(1972))).
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to “outsource” interrogations to foreign governments. As Part III argues,
this is precisely what has occurred.
II. Interrogations Abroad
Interrogations abroad take three basic forms. First, there are
matters that are exclusively investigated by foreign governments with an
eye towards prosecuting violations of those governments’ domestic laws.
Occasionally, such investigations will uncover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing that violates U.S. law, and the foreign government, if it is so
inclined, will alert U.S. authorities and share incriminatory statements
115
provided by the accused. Second, there are interrogations conducted
exclusively by U.S. authorities as part of a U.S. criminal investigation, or
116
intelligence gathering effort. Depending on the circumstances, foreign
governments may or may not be involved in providing U.S. officials with
logistical support. Between these two extremes lies a more common third
scenario: joint investigations that entail cooperation between the United
117
States and foreign governments. In theory, at least, joint investigations
ought to pose the greatest difficulties for courts. those difficulties are
addressed extensively in Part III. For the time being, however, I focus my
attention on the two extremes, for that is where courts have thus far had
the most to say.
This Part is comprised of two Subparts. Subpart A explains the law
of coerced confessions as it applies to statements elicited by foreign
governments. Subpart B, in turn, considers what rules apply when U.S.
officials conduct overseas interrogations, at least insofar as they seek to
admit statements procured during those interrogations at subsequent
criminal trials.
A preliminary word must be said about the nature of the Miranda
decision. For much of the last fifty years, scholars and jurists have
fiercely debated whether Miranda embodies a constitutional rule
coextensive with the Fifth Amendment or a judge made prophylactic rule
that overprotects constitutional rights in order to achieve effective
118
deterrence of unlawful police behavior. Which side one takes in this
115. See, e.g., United States v. Bary, 978 F. Supp. 2d 356, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Instead, the U.K.
police conducted a ‘completely British operation’ in which Abdel Bary was arrested and interviewed. As
this operation was not a joint venture with the U.S. government, no Miranda warnings were required.”).
116. Fred Medick, Exporting Miranda: Protecting the Right Against Self-Incrimination When U.S.
Officers Perform Custodial Interrogations Abroad, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 173 (2009) (explaining
the Mirandized U.S. interrogation of Zeinab Taleb-Jedi, an American citizen accused of materially
supporting MeK).
117. For example, see United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2008).
118. Compare Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (refusing to interpret Miranda “narrowly”
and noting that “[t]he concern of the Court in Miranda was that the ‘interrogation environment’ created by
the interplay of interrogation and custody would ‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and
thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination”), with New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984) (“The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are ‘not themselves rights protected by the
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debate is likely to determine how one views the constitutionality of the
coerced confessions doctrine as it has been applied abroad.
The Supreme Court, for its part, has taken great pains to confuse
the matter. With ample reason, scholars have described the Court’s
119
jurisprudence in this area as “internally inconsistent” and “incoherent.”
In the three decades after Miranda was decided, the Court expended
much effort debating the nature of its commands. In 1984, the Court’s
conservative wing scored a victory when, in a 5–4 decision, it described
Miranda as a prophylactic rule that could be dispensed with whenever
120
“overriding considerations of public safety” justified doing so. This led
many commentators to suspect Miranda was nearing its death. But then
in 2000, the Court’s liberal and conservative wings reached a sort of
pragmatic détente. By holding that Miranda was a “constitutional
decision,” the Court refuted Congress’s attempt to statutorily will it out
121
of being. At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed the
continuing vitality of Miranda exceptions like Quarles, essentially
122
freezing the doctrine in place.
In what follows, this Article unapologetically adopts the view that
Miranda was not merely a “constitutional decision”whatever that
meansbut the recognition of a constitutional rule that custodial
interrogations are per se unconstitutional absent Miranda warnings. Under
any fair reading, Miranda cannot be characterized as merely prophylactic.
Indeed, as Justice O’Connor, ordinarily no friend of Miranda, felt
obligated to recognize in her Quarles concurrence, Miranda “held
unconstitutional, because inherently compelled, the admission of
statements derived from in-custody questioning not preceded by an
explanation of the privilege against self-incrimination and the
123
consequences of forgoing it.” Although she disagreed with that holding,
O’Connor at least recognized it for what it was. The same cannot be said
for the Court’s more conservative members, who instead launched a
sideways assault on Miranda by purposefully distorting its meaning.

Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is]
protected.’” (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))) (illustrating the Court’s inconsistent
interpretations of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence as either being rooted in the Constitution or constructed
by judges).
119. Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final FrontierThe International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United
States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 Duke L.J. 1703, 1750 (2002);
M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 Brook. L. Rev.
241, 245 n.27 (2002).
120. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651.
121. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
122. Id. at 441 (“These decisions illustrate the principlenot that Miranda is not a constitutional
rulebut that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly
foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications
represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.”).
123. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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One must nevertheless concede the success of that assault. Today,
124
the Supreme Court routinely labels Miranda a prophylactic rule. The
implicit assumption is that its requirements ought to be subject to a
general balancing test that weighs society’s need for information against
125
the individual’s right to be free from compulsion. And yet, in contrast
to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, there is
nothing in the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause that would permit
courts to engage in such a balancing test. As I argue here, the confusion
around Miranda’s nature has produced a perverse outcome. Judges
appear to be in fact applying a balancing test, though they avoid naming
it as such. Terrorism suspects, of course, are almost always destined to
come out on the losing end of such tests. The result is law that speaks
more generally about what law enforcement is permitted to do in the
context of international investigations, but which nearly always favors
expansive interpretations of government power.
A. Interrogations by Foreign Governments
If one accepts the premise that Miranda deems custodial
interrogations inherently coercive, then U.S. courts should not admit
incriminating statements absent some indication that the suspect has
affirmatively made a knowledgeable and voluntary waiver of his or her
right not to speak. Of course, that is not to say confessions may only be
admitted if foreign governments adhere to a specific articulation of
Miranda warnings. The Miranda Court itself stipulated that its decision
was not intended to create a “constitutional straitjacket” and that “other
procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
126
it” would be constitutionally permissible.
At a minimum, it would seem that if one takes seriously the idea
that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, then to be admissible,
statements made to foreign governments would have to at least be
preceded by a warning that the suspect need not speak. The question of
whether counsel must be provided upon request is a more difficult one.
Both the Miranda and Edwards courts laid great stress on a suspect’s
124. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269 (2011) (“[T]his Court in Miranda
adopted a set of prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination.”); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (“We have likewise established the
Miranda exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the
text of the Self-Incrimination Clausethe admission into evidence in a criminal case of confessions
obtained through coercive custodial questioning.”); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437 (noting that the Court
has repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as “prophylactic”).
125. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and
Understandings, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 781, 790 (2006) (“Today, the Miranda warnings are most accurately
considered a judge-made, prophylactic rule, the application of which can be subjected to a balancing test.”).
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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127

ability to confer with counsel, so it would be reasonable to conclude
that the availability of counsel is a necessary precursor to any valid
waiver of one’s right against self-incrimination. But different cultures
have different legal traditions, and it may be a step too far to assume that
custodial interrogations abroad are always compulsory in the absence of
counsel.
In any event, the foregoing is largely a matter of academic curiosity
because U.S. courts have uniformly declined to apply the Miranda
128
warning/waiver framework to statements made to foreign officials. The
logic of these decisions rests on two erroneous assumptions. First, courts
that view Miranda as representing a prophylactic rule against unlawful
police behavior reason that the exclusion in an American trial of
statements obtained abroad will have no deterrent effect on foreign
129
officials. While that is probably overstating the matter slightly, the
general sentiment is logical. However, as previously explained, such
reasoning misunderstands the nature of Miranda. If waivers are required
because custodial interrogations are inherently coercive, then deterrence
is largely beside the point. Second, courts have sometimes said that the
United States “cannot dictate the protections provided to criminal
130
suspects by foreign nations.” True enough, but the relevancy of this
observation to the issue of a confession’s admissibility is unclear. If
meant to suggest law enforcement officials must either use the unwarned
statements or forego introducing a confession altogether, it represents a
false choice. Under ordinary circumstances, U.S. law enforcement
personnel remain free to question a suspect themselves. The Supreme
Court has never held, and no commentator as far as I know has ever
suggested, that the taint of an earlier unwarned interrogation is
incurable, particularly if that taint was caused by an entirely different law
enforcement agency.

127. Id. at 469 (“[T]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.”); Arizona v.
Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right
to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 227 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[V]oluntary statements
obtained from a defendant by foreign law enforcement officers, even without Miranda warnings,
generally are admissible.”); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he law is
settled that statements taken by foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings are admissible if
voluntary.”).
129. See, e.g., Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227 (noting “deterrence of unlawful police activityis absent
when foreign agents direct an interrogation”); United States v. Martindale, 790 F.2d 1129, 1132 (4th
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he exclusionary rule has little or no effect upon the conduct of foreign police.”);
United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 182 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d sub nom., In re
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177 (2d. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he deterrent
rationale of the exclusionary rule, it is posited, has little force with respect to a foreign sovereign.”).
130. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227.
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All of this is to say that courts’ refusal to apply the principles of
Miranda to statements that are the product of custodial interrogations by
foreign officials is misguided. The voluntariness standard that courts
employ when analyzing such statements permits not only a host of
nonphysical coercive tactics, but significantly increases the chances that
statements coerced by torture will be admitted as well.
131
132
Consider United States v. Abu Ali and United States v. Marzook.
The defendants in both cases credibly claimed that their statements to
foreign officials were the product of torture. The claims seemed
plausible, in part, because the governments to which they gave the
statementsSaudia Arabia and Israelwere widely known to engage in
133
Indeed, the U.S. State Department has issued reports
torture.
134
acknowledging as much. But neither the Abu Ali nor the Marzook
court was willing to give any weight to such pattern and practice evidence
in deciding whether the defendants’ respective statements should be
135
Instead, they focused their attention on a selective
suppressed.
hodgepodge of factors previously identified by the Supreme Court as
relevant to the inquiry, while downplaying or ignoring others. Moreover,
in conducting the voluntariness inquiry, they focused their attention
almost exclusively on physical, as opposed to psychological, coercion.
The cases indicate the dangers of allowing courts to make ad hoc
determinations of voluntariness in terrorism cases. In the absence of
Miranda’s application to foreign-led interrogations, courts should at least
subject such interrogations to a level of scrutiny equivalent to that which
federal courts applied to state confessions prior to incorporation. As
others have already recognized, they can do so, first, by acknowledging
credible pattern or practice evidence that suggests a country routinely
136
and second, by demanding that the U.S.
engages in torture,
government meet a higher evidentiary burden in order to admit the
137
statements as proof of guilt at trial.

131. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. Va. 2005).
132. United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
133. See, e.g., High Court of Justice [HCJ] May 26, 1999, 5100 HCJ 94 (Isr.), http://www.btselem.org/
download/hc5100_94_19990906_torture_ruling.pdf (finding unconstitutional techniques commonly used by
Israel General Security Service throughout the 1990s, including use of stress positions and sleep and sensory
deprivation).
134. H.R. Comm. on Int’l Relations & S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., Rep. on
Country Human Rights Practices for 2003 (Comm. Print, vol. II, 2004); 2003 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/index.htm (last visited Aug. 5,
2016).
135. Amnesty Int’l, USA: The Trial of Ahmed Abu AliFindings of Amnesty
International’s Trial Observation 5 (2005).
136. Wadie E. Said, Coercing Voluntariness, 85 Ind. L.J. 1, 46 (2010); Condon, supra note 45, at
688–89.
137. Said, supra note 136, at 46.
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What stands out about the Abu Ali and Marzook cases, besides the
allegations of torture, is that in each case the prosecution relied heavily
on the defendants’ confessions. Ahmad Omar Abu Ali was born in
138
Houston, Texas, and raised in Falls Church, Virginia. In 2000, Abu Ali
withdrew from the University of Maryland, where he was a freshman, to
139
travel to Saudi Arabia to study Islamic theology. While there, he
allegedly became associated with a group of Islamic radicals, including
140
members of Al Qaeda. In June of 2003, Saudi officials arrested Abu Ali
in the aftermath of the previous month’s Riyadh suicide bomb attacks
141
that killed nine Americans. Abu Ali spent the next forty-seven days in
incommunicado detention, during which time he was continually
interrogated by Saudi officials and, according to his testimony, subjected
142
to physical torture. Upon request, Saudi officials allowed U.S. officials
to observe one of Abu Ali’s interrogation sessions, at which time they
143
asked him American-drafted questions. Eventually, Abu Ali made a
videotaped confession in which he “confess[ed] that he plotted to hijack
144
civilian planes and conspired to assassinate President Bush.” For
several months, the U.S. government declined to state why Abu Ali had
been arrested and whether charges had been or would be filed against
145
him. That caused his family to file a habeas petition nearly a year after
his arrest, claiming the U.S. government had orchestrated Abu Ali’s
146
incarceration in Saudi Arabia for the purpose of torturing him. When
Judge John D. Bates of the D.C. District Court rejected the government’s
attempt to dismiss the petition, and ordered the commencement of
147
discovery, the government suddenly reversed course and produced Abu
148
Ali for trial in the Eastern District of Virginia. That court ultimately
rejected Abu Ali’s suppression motion, after which he was tried,
convicted, and sentenced to thirty years in prison. The Fourth Circuit,
however, considered the sentence too lenient and remanded for
149
resentencing. Consequently, Abu Ali was given a life term.
138. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343 (E.D. Va. 2005).
139. David Stout, Man Charged in Alleged Plot to Kill President Bush, N.Y. Times (Feb. 22, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/02/22/national/man-charged-in-alleged-plot-to-kill-president-bush.html.
140. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 371.
143. Id. at 343.
144. Condon, supra note 45, at 648.
145. Caryle Murphy & John Mintz, Va. Man’s Months in Saudi Prison Go Unexplained, Wash. Post
(Nov. 22, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/11/22/va-mans-months-in-saudiprison-go-unexplained/327bd225-9907-4d2e-b778-91798013e63b/.
146. Id.
147. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
148. Condon, supra note 45, at 648.
149. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that “the district court
abused its discretion when it compared Abu Ali’s case to those of Lindh and of McVeigh and Nichols,
respectively, and used those comparisons as a basis for its sentence”).
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Marzook was an odd case in that it involved the prosecution of a
man accused of materially supporting Hamas based on statements he had
150
given to Israeli security agents more than ten years prior. The
defendant, Muhammad Hamid Khalil Salah, had been arrested at a
151
checkpoint between Gaza and Israel on January 25, 1993. Israeli
152
authorities repeatedly interrogated him for nearly two months. Salah
claimed that his statements were involuntary because they had been
elicited through torture. He described his conditions of confinement as
follows:
[Israeli interrogators] placed a “filthy, foul-smelling hood” over his head,
handcuffed him behind his back, and forced him to sit in a “slanted childsized chair in a position that caused excruciating pain between [his]
shoulder blades and in [his] back”a technique known in Israel as
“waiting periods.” While in this position, he claims that he was subjected
to “deafening music and the sounds of people screaming in pain,” and
that someone slapped him on his head and face. In addition, Salah claims
they handcuffed him to a metal bar behind his back in a “dark, freezing,
153
closet-sized cell in which [he] could not stand upright, sit or lie down.

Although the Israeli interrogators who testified at Salah’s
suppression hearing acknowledged routinely using such techniques on
detainees, they claimed not to have done so with Salah because they
received a directive from the head of the Israel Securities Authority
instructing them to “treat Muhammad Salah differently than other
154
detainees.” Based in part on this uncorroborated testimony, the trial
court ruled the majority of Salah’s statements voluntary and, therefore,
155
admissible.
It is impossible to know with any certainty, of course, whether Abu
Ali or Salah’s claims of torture are meritorious. As a general matter, it
would not be unheard of for a criminal defendant to distort the
circumstances surrounding his confession, though it is worth noting that,
even post-trial, both Abu Ali’s and Salah’s lawyers have been steadfast in
156
their conviction that their clients were, in fact, tortured. But putting to
the side whether or not the Abu Ali and Marzook courts reached the
right outcome, the deficiencies of the processes they employed in getting
there should trouble everyone.

150. United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 739.
154. Id. at 717.
155. Id. at 762.
156. See, e.g., Michael E. Deutsch & Erica Thompson, Secrets and Lies: The Persecution of Muhammad
Salah (Part I), 37 J. Palestine Stud. 38, 39 (2008) (noting Salah’s acquittal and describing it as “a victory for
opponents of torture, government secrecy, and the U.S. government’s uncritical and unconditional support
for Israel”).
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Both the Abu Ali and Marzook courts ignored or heavily discounted
pattern and practice evidence documenting the widespread use of
coercive techniques by both Saudi Arabian and Israeli intelligence
agencies. In Abu Ali, the trial court denied defense lawyers the
opportunity to present evidence concerning “Saudi Arabia’s human
rights record, its record on torture, and even particularly on the record of
157
the Mabahith al-Amma,” the agency that interrogated Abu Ali. The
court would not even permit the testimony of two British witnesses who
were housed in the same prison as Abu Ali at the time of his
incarceration, and could presumably speak to the conditions of his
158
confinement. The Marzook court, by contrast, did permit two defense
witnesses to testify about Israeli interrogation practices and human rights
abuses. But, it proceeded to give that testimony almost no weight because
the witnesses did not personally observe Salah’s interrogations and spoke
mostly of Israeli treatment of Palestinian, as opposed to American,
159
Instead, the court credited the Israeli interrogators’
detainees.
unsubstantiated assertion that Israeli policy prohibited subjecting U.S.
160
citizens like Salah to ordinary torture techniques. Indeed, the court
161
specifically found Salah’s American citizenship to be “significant.” The
court made that finding despite the fact that Salah’s assertions of torture
were hardly newhe had described them to American consular officials
162
on February 12, 1993, eighteen days into his custodial interrogation. In
discounting Salah’s corroborated affidavit, the court placed great
emphasis on the fact that he had self-reported to consular officials that
the period in which he was “hooded, tied with his hands behind him and
163
forced to sit on a low stool” had lasted only two days.
The problematic nature of the voluntariness analysis is underscored
by the Marzook and Abu Ali courts’ reliance on the lack of physical
markers to corroborate the defendants’ allegations. Both courts thought
it highly significant that physical examinations failed to uncover
definitive evidence of torture. The court’s approach in Abu Ali was, in
fact, highly disingenuous. Abu Ali’s medical witness testified that he
observed ten scars on his back in corroboration of Abu Ali’s claims of
164
physical torture. In contrast, the government presented a dermatologist
that had never physically examined Abu Ali, but who claimed, based
entirely on high-resolution photographs, that the markings on Abu Ali’s
back were not scars, but pigmentation discolorations that “may [have
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Amnesty Int’l, supra note 135, at 4.
Id.
Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 755.
Id.
United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 375 (E.D. Va. 2005).
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been] caused by intentional or non-intentional trauma.” The court
nevertheless characterized the suppression hearing as consisting of
166
“disparate medical opinions” concerning Abu Ali’s allegations.
Ultimately, the court expressed its “reservations” about the diagnosis
offered by Abu Ali’s physician, and concluded that “[i]n the end, judges,
not physicians, have to make the ultimate determination of the
credibility of all of the testimony.” Relying on the testimony of the Saudi
agents, it found the government had met its burden of proving
167
voluntariness.
In reviewing Abu Ali and Marzook it is hard to avoid the conclusion
that the courts characterized the evidence in such a way as to fit a
predetermined preference for admissibility. A more charitable reading
would recognize that determinations of torture are incredibly difficult in
the absence of definitive physical proof. That is one of the many reasons
why the voluntariness standard is so troubling. Because ad hoc
voluntariness inquiries permit courts to consider a hodgepodge of factors
and assign them whatever weight they wish, decisions over admissibility
are likely to mirror the policy preferences or prejudices of the individual
factfinder. Moreover, courts are far removed from the custodial
interrogation setting. Finding out “what really happened” may be a
practical impossibility, made no easier for courts by the government’s
constant invocation of secrecy and defendants’ general unwillingness to
testify at suppression hearings for fear of subjecting themselves to
sentencing enhancements should the court find their testimony
perjurious. Avoiding these difficulties, of course, was precisely the point
of Miranda. By creating a bright-line rule requiring a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver prior to questioning, the Court hoped to
avoid so many of the contentious issues that had divided it in the pre168
incorporation era.
A fifth, and final, criticism of the Marzook and Abu Ali decisions bears
mentioning. Within the conversation surrounding torture, it is easy to forget
that the voluntariness inquiry does not rest on findings of physical coercion.
In the domestic setting, courts have found confessions involuntary where
they occurred in circumstances that involved prolonged periods of
169
170
incommunicado detention without charge, solitary confinement, sleep
171
172
173
deprivation, threats, and even promises of leniency. By ignoring, or at
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 374.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 227 (1940).
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 (1949).
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 560, 567 (1958).
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 560 (1954).
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least heavily discounting such factors, the Marzook and Abu Ali courts have
created an inconsistency in the way voluntariness is measured at home
compared to abroad.
B. Interrogations by U.S. Officials
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide whether the
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause applies to custodial
interrogations conducted by U.S. officials abroad. Several lower courts,
174
however, have either concluded or assumed that it does. Their
reasoning is primarily based on linguistic differences between the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment’s text. In contrast to the Fourth Amendment’s
invocation of the term “the people,” which the Court in VerdugoUrquidez divined to be a “term of art” referencing some “class of
175
persons who are part of a national community,” the Fifth Amendment
176
speaks more generically of “persons.” Perhaps more to the point, the
177
Self-Incrimination Clause is frequently spoken of as a “trial right,”
meaning violations occur only when testimony is admitted in a domestic
criminal proceeding. Violations of the Fourth Amendment, by contrast,
are “‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an unreasonable governmental
178
intrusion.” Finally, courts have concluded that the policies that support
Miranda and the Self-Incrimination Clause, described above as
individual autonomy, deterrence, and reliability, are equally implicated
when U.S. law enforcement officials interrogate a foreign national
overseas as they are when those same officials interrogate an American
179
citizen in a local stationhouse. Taken together, these considerations

174. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008);
United States v. Hassan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d
8 (D.D.C. 2006); United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
175. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 259–60 (1990).
176. U.S. Const. amend V.
177. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 760 (2003).
178. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
179. Those policies were eloquently described by Justice Goldberg, who Judge Sand cited in his
Bin Laden opinion:
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is
often a protection to the innocent.
Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 185; In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552
F.3d 177, 200 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 690 (1998)).
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have led every court that has considered the issue to conclude that
Miranda applies to U.S. agencies operating abroad.
But what exactly does compliance with Miranda mean? Judge
Leonard Sand offered perhaps the most robust version of Miranda’s
application overseas in evaluating the confession of Mohamed Rasheed
Daoud al-Owhali, a Saudi national accused, and eventually convicted of,
participating in the 1998 Nairobi Embassy bombing. In the aftermath of
the bombing, al-Owhali had been picked up by FBI agents and their
Kenyan counterparts and questioned for nearly two weeks before finally
180
confessing. According to the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted
him, “[w]ithout the confession, it is highly unlikely there would have
181
been a case against him.” FBI agents had, in fact, Mirandized al-Owhali
in Kenya. But, they had modified the right-to-counsel portion of the
warnings to read:
In the United States, you would have the right to talk to a lawyer to get
advice before we ask you any questions and you could have a lawyer
with you during questioning. In the United States, if you could not
afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for you, if you wish, before
any questioning. Because we are not in the United States, we cannot
ensure that you will have a lawyer appointed for you before any
182
questioning.

The court was therefore faced with two questions: (1) does Miranda
apply abroad to custodial interrogations conducted by FBI agents; and
(2) must a suspect be informed that he has the right to counsel if the host
country does not provide such counsel as a matter of right?
Judge Sand swiftly dismissed the government’s argument that alOwhali had no Fifth Amendment rights because his only connection to
183
the United States was his desire to attack it. In addition to the reasons
listed above, Judge Sand noted that the Supreme Court had previously
held the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applicable to both
184
resident and nonresident aliens. As to the second question, Judge Sand
found the modified warnings wanting. He began by recognizing that U.S.
agents could not “compel a foreign sovereign to accept blind allegiance
to American criminal procedure, at least when U.S. involvement in the
185
foreign investigation is limited to mutual cooperation.” But, “to the
maximum extent reasonably possible,” U.S. officials should be required
to make efforts “to replicate what rights would be present if the

180. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 174–75.
181. Andrew C. McCarthy, The Global Fifth Amendment: Obama Goes to Court, Part II: Miranda
Meets Al-Qaeda, Nat’l Review (June 16, 2009), http://www.nationalreview.com/node/227705/print.
182. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 180.
183. Id. at 181.
184. Id. at 183 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 873
(1985)).
185. Id. at 188.
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interrogation were being conducted in America.” In this regard, Judge
187
Sand believed al-Owhali’s interrogators had failed. He found that the
advice-of-rights form presented to the defendant wrongly conveyed to alOwhali that, “due to his custodial situs outside the United States, he
currently possesse[d] no opportunity to avail himself of the services of an
188
attorney before or during questioning by U.S. officials.” In fact, there
was some evidence that, had U.S. officials inquired into the possibility of
locating counsel for al-Owhali, Kenyan authorities might have
189
complied.
Judge Sand’s opinion has been subjected to attack from all quarters.
There are those who believe the opinion did not go far enough in
recognizing the indispensability of a suspect’s right to speak with counsel
190
before submitting to custodial interrogation. To Judge Sand’s critics it
seems inconceivable that the scope of a suspect’s right against self191
incrimination could turn on the vagaries of foreign law. On the other
hand, Judge Sand himself eventually backpedaled from his original
decision to exclude al-Owhali’s statements, perhaps cognizant of the fact
192
that suppression would have effectively ended the government’s case.
Judge Sand maintained the contention that U.S. authorities have an
obligation to familiarize themselves with local law and comply with
Miranda to the fullest extent possible, but he ultimately found alOwhali’s statements admissible on the alternative grounds that one of
193
the FBI agents had orally advised him of his right to an attorney. One
wonders whether Judge Sand’s opinion, which was issued in 2000, would
have looked the same had it been written after the events of September
11th.
When the Second Circuit eventually got around to reviewing Judge
194
Sand’s decision eight years later, it rejected his reasoning. The court,
while noting that Miranda’s “deterrence rationale retains its force” in the
international setting as applied to U.S. agents, nonetheless refused to
195
even confirm Judge Sand’s assessment that Miranda applies abroad.
Instead, the Second Circuit chose to critique his reasoning while simply
196
assuming that Miranda “might” apply extraterritorially. In contrast to
Judge Sand’s skepticism over the advice-of-rights form, the Second
186. Id.
187. Id. at 190.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., David T. Henek, Ensuring Miranda’s Right to Counsel in U.S. Interrogations Abroad,
57 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 557, 562 (2013).
191. Id. at 578.
192. McCarthy, supra note 181.
193. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
194. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177, 203 (2d. Cir. 2008).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 198.
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Circuit was far more forgiving of the agents’ efforts to comply with the
law. According to the court, U.S. law enforcement personnel need only
make “an honest, good faith effort to provide accurate information,” not
197
“advocate on behalf of suspects.” The Second Circuit further noted
that Miranda had previously been “applied in a flexible fashion to
198
accommodate the exigencies of local conditions.” The Court relied in
particular on Duckworth v. Eagan, a decision that upheld a state warning
that accurately informed criminal suspects that they had the right to
speak with an attorney, but that they would only be provided one “if and
199
when” they went to court. The Second Circuit was also apparently
worried about the burden that Judge Sand’s opinion would have on law
enforcement officers operating overseas. In the court’s words, “U.S.
agents acting overseas need not become experts in foreign criminal
200
procedure in order to comply with Miranda.”
Although problematic in that it does not recognize Miranda’s
applicability abroad, the Second Circuit’s criticism of Judge Sand’s
decision is hard to disagree with. The agents in al-Owhali appear to have
made a good faith effort to comply with Miranda, and took care not to
mislead al-Owhali as to the nature of his rights. Judge Sand also appears
to have gone too far in requiring FBI agents to familiarize themselves
with the local laws of whatever jurisdiction they happen to be operating
in at any given time. It is true that since the African embassy bombings,
201
the number of FBI attaché offices have expanded exponentially. But,
the character of the working relationship between Kenya and the U.S.
intelligence communities at the time of al-Owhali’s arrest is less clear. In
any event, Judge Sand’s opinion appears to too easily disregard
incentives. The harder you make it for U.S. officials to comply with
Miranda, the more likely they are to defer to the parallel system of
largely unregulated, foreign-led interrogations.
This brings up a more troubling reality that the Second Circuit
raised, but did not resolve:

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 205.
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 197 (1989).
In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 198.
Condon, supra note 45, at 667.
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We are aware that, as defendants urge, foreign detainees may run the
risk of refusing to speak to U.S. officials only to find themselves forced to
speak to their foreign jailors. This would be so, however, even if U.S.
agents made efforts to secure counsel on their behalf and those efforts
proved fruitless. The risk of being forced to speak to their foreign jailors
would also exist, moreover, if U.S. agents were not involved at all. Of
course, statements obtained under these circumstances could not be
admitted in a U.S. trial if the situation indicated that the statements were
202
made involuntarily.

That last statement largely misses the mark given the relatively low
bar that the voluntariness threshold poses for the admission of
internationally obtained confessions. But the Court, perhaps unwittingly,
spoke to the real problem: What choice does a suspect have but to talk to
U.S. officials when he is detained in a foreign jail in some third world
country?
Although a lot of academic commentary has been devoted to Judge
Sand’s decision and the Second Circuit’s follow-up, neither opinion really
speaks to the actual coercion that suspects experience in foreign custody.
Even if some form of Miranda warnings are required, that will hardly solve
the problem of coerced statements abroad. That is because the U.S.
government has exploited certain loopholes in the Miranda warnings/waiver
framework. Those loopholes are the subject of Part III of this Article.
III. Circumventing MIRANDA
A. Joint Ventures
As has been made clear at this point, a major disconnect exists in
the law of coerced confessions. Miranda, in some form at least, appears
to apply to the actions of U.S. law enforcement abroad. But, statements
elicited by foreign officials are governed by a much looser voluntariness
standard. While some might hope for district courts to more stringently
enforce the voluntariness standard by, say, increasing the evidentiary
burden for admission or acknowledging pattern and practice evidence,
such hopes do not appear realistic. The problem is that the voluntariness
standard too easily lends itself to judicial policy preferences masquerading
as law.
So long as U.S. courts view interrogations in a binary U.S./non-U.S.
manner, the law of coerced confessions is likely to provide little protection
to criminal defendants who have the misfortune of being questioned
overseas. Moreover, if U.S. courts insist on Miranda’s application
whenever U.S. officials engage in questioning, it is likely there will be an
acceleration in the outsourcing of interrogations to foreign governments.

202. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 208.
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The joint venture doctrine offers a readymade way out of the
morass, but I am skeptical that courts will embrace its lessons. After all,
that doctrine was fashioned in the context of Prohibition. One need not
be a full-fledged legal realist to understand that courts are likely to view
the threat of bathtub gin differently than that of improvised explosive
devices. In the pre-incorporation era, skeptical federal courts seemed
principally concerned with ensuring federal officials did not circumvent
constitutional safeguards. By contrast, those same courts today display
an eager willingness to defer to national security concerns of which they
know little and, consequently, are more worried about freeing federal
officials from constitutional restraints than using those restraints to bind
them.
Abu Ali provides a case in point. The level of Saudi-U.S. cooperation
remains something of a mystery because the U.S. government repeatedly
invoked national security as a basis for denying both the court and defense
counsel access to information about the nature of the relationship. We do
know, however, that Saudi officials granted a U.S. government request to
203
attend one of Abu Ali’s interrogations. At that same interrogation, Saudi
agents asked Abu Ali six of thirteen questions prepared by American
204
intelligence officials. It is not clear why Saudi officials omitted the other
seven questions. In any event, Abu Ali moved to suppress his statements
during that interrogation session on the basis of joint venture. The district
court denied his request.
Interestingly, joint venture is the only issue that divided the Fourth
Circuit when it decided Abu Ali’s appeal. Judges Traxler and Wilkinson
found no evidence of joint venture, which they recast as a doctrine
205
requiring “a significant degree of investigative control or authority.”
The court found it highly significant, for instance, that the Saudis refused
to ask seven of the thirteen questions posed by American intelligence
206
officials, a “majority” as the court pointed out. Judge Motz countered
by pointing out that such formalism would provide easy cover for U.S.
207
and foreign governments to circumvent Miranda.
Judges Traxler and Wilkinson, however, went on to forthrightly
acknowledge the policy considerations motivating their position. First,
adopting a more stringent joint venture doctrine would “contravene the
well-established notion that Miranda, which is intended to regulate only
the conduct of American law enforcement officers, does not apply
extraterritorially to foreign officials absent significant involvement by

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 225 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 229 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 230 n.6.
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American law enforcement.” Never mind that this begs the question of
what “significant involvement” means. For Judge Motz, the significant
level of U.S. involvement in Abu Ali’s interrogation was not difficult to
discern: “Whatever else ‘active’ or ‘substantial’ participation may mean,
when United States law enforcement officials propose the questions
propounded by foreign law enforcement officials, and those questions
are asked in the presence of, and in consultation with United States law
enforcement officials, this must constitute ‘active’ or ‘substantial’
209
participation.”
The second concern held by Judges Traxler and Wilkinson’s was
that “a broad per se holding could potentially discourage the United
States and its allies from cooperating in criminal investigations of an
210
international scope.” While perhaps true, the judges put forward no
explanation for how such a concern related to their duty to pass on the
constitutional rights of criminal suspects. Indeed, this was precisely the
type of argument thrust upon the Supreme Court in its pre-incorporation
joint venture cases, one that it flatlyand repeatedlyrejected as
211
inconsistent with its duty to speak to individual rights. In any event, it
seems hyperbolic to suggest that cooperation between U.S. and foreign
law enforcement agencies will come to a grinding halt simply because
foreign officials are required to Mirandize suspects prior to asking them
questions posed by the United States.
B. Two-Step Interrogations
In November 2009, agents of the Nigerian State Security Service
arrested Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed, a Swedish permanent resident of
212
Eritrean dissent. Ahmed subsequently pled guilty to providing material
213
support to al-Shabaab, a militant Islamic organization. Prior to his
guilty plea, Ahmed faced more serious charges and sought to suppress
various statements he had made to Nigerian and U.S. officials. I was a
member of Ahmed’s defense team while in law school and helped draft
the post-hearing brief in support of his motion to suppress.
As recounted in our brief, Ahmed alleged that Nigerian officials had
held him incommunicado for over 100 days without charging him with a
214
crime or bringing him before a Nigerian court. During the period of his
208. Id. at 229 n.5.
209. Id. at 230 n.6.
210. Id. at 229 n.5.
211. See supra Part I.B.
212. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 105, United States v. Ahmed, No. 10-cr-131, 2012, WL
1805050 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
213. Benjamin Weiser, Man Offers Guilty Plea, Upending Terror Case, N.Y. Times (June 13, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/nyregion/man-who-trained-with-somalis-offers-guilty-plea-endingpivotal-case.html.
214. See Defendant’s Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 30, at 44–65.
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confinement, Nigerian and American officials allegedly interrogated him
215
no fewer than nineteen times. Ahmed further alleged that his Nigerian
jailers had denied him access to an attorney, his family, or Swedish
216
consular officials.
The U.S. Government subsequently sought to introduce statements it
had procured from Ahmed as part of a deliberate two-step interrogation
strategy. In December 2009, American officials received permission from
217
their Nigerian counterparts to interrogate Ahmed. Prior to the initial
interrogation, those same officials devised a two-step interrogation plan
admittedly designed to evade the requirements of Miranda. The plan
involved a so-called “dirty” interrogation in which U.S. interrogators
purposefully avoided administering Miranda warnings so that Ahmed
would more freely “confess,” followed by the insertion of a second team of
interrogators to purportedly “clean” Ahmed’s prior statements of their
218
taint so they could be used against him in a criminal trial. Ahmed was
never informed by the “clean” team of the inadmissibility of his prior
statements or the reason for the two interrogations.
The same tactic has been used on other foreign detainees. The
Obama administration has increasingly favored a hybrid model of
detention in which terrorism suspects are temporarily detained on naval
ships before being brought to the United States. This occurred with both
219
Ahmed Abdulkhadir Warsame and Abu Anas al-Libi. In Warsame’s
case, a “dirty” team interrogated him for two months before providing
220
him with Miranda warnings. Al-Libi’s interrogation lasted a shorter
time only because he had hepatitis C and U.S. officials were concerned
221
about his declining health.
Ahmed moved to suppress the statements obtained by U.S.
interrogators as the product of an illicit two-step interrogation under the
222
Supreme Court’s 2004 holding in Missouri v. Seibert. The district court
never reached the merits of Ahmed’s motion, however, because Ahmed
ultimately accepted a plea deal that permitted him to serve less than ten

215. Id. at 1.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2.
218. Id.
219. Peter Finn, Somali’s Case a Template for U.S. as It Seeks to Prosecute Terrorism Suspects in
Federal Court, Wash. Post (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/somaliscase-a-template-for-us-as-it-seeks-to-prosecute-terrorism-suspects-in-federal-court/2013/03/30/53b38fd0988a-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html.
220. Id.
221. Shaun Waterman, Al-Libi’s Capture Revives Debate over Trying Terrorist Suspects, Wash.
Times (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/15/al-libis-capture-revives-debateover-trying-terror/?page=all. Al-Libi subsequently died in U.S. custody while awaiting trial.
222. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620 (2004).
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years in prison. Absent the deal, Ahmed would have faced a potential
life sentence if convicted.
While we do not know how the district court would have ruled, the
facts of Ahmed’s case tell us much about how the government is
conducting the war on terror with one eye on the prospective admissibility
of confessions and one eye on intelligence gathering. The government
claimed that it had not violated Ahmed’s rights, and Seibert was not
applicable because the sole purpose of the unwarned interrogation had
224
been to procure intelligence information.
If Ahmed had not accepted a plea deal, the admissibility of his
confession would have turned on an interpretation of Seibert, a case that
produced no majority opinion. A brief review of Seibert’s facts may
prove helpful. The defendant in Seibert was believed to be involved in
225
the murder of her twelve-year-old, physically handicapped son. The
arresting officer’s superior instructed him to refrain from administering
Miranda warnings pursuant to the department’s question-first interrogation
226
policy. During the subsequent un-Mirandized interrogation, the defendant
227
implicated herself in her son’s murder. After providing her with a brief
twenty-minute break, the officer administered Miranda warnings and
228
obtained a signed waiver of rights. At no time did he inform the
defendant that her prior statements were inadmissible. During this
second interrogation, she proceeded to repeat her prior, un-Mirandized
229
statements.
Seibert provided the Court with an opportunity to revisit the holding
230
of an earlier case, Oregon v. Elstad. The Elstad Court had declined to
rule a Mirandized confession inadmissible where it had been preceded by
a Miranda violation. Elstad’s holding, in favor of admissibility, may fairly
be characterized as resting on the unintentional nature of the Miranda
231
violation at issue in that case. The initial Miranda violation in Elstad
occurred at the time of the defendant’s arrest, rather than in a formal
custodial interrogation setting. Officers had gone to the defendant’s
232
home with the intention of executing an arrest warrant. When they
arrived, the officers made “a brief stop in the living room” where one
223. Weiser, supra note 213.
224. Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum by the Government in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress at 29–30, United States v. Ahmed, No. S1-10-cr-131, 2012 WL 6061229 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012).
225. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 605.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
231. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615 (“[I]t is fair to read Elstad as treating the living room conversation as a goodfaith Miranda mistake, not only open to correction by careful warnings before systematic questioning in that
particular case, but posing no threat to warn-first practice generally.”).
232. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300.
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spoke with the defendant who made an incriminating admission. The
purpose of the arresting officers’ stop in the living room “was not to
interrogate the suspect but to notify his mother of the reason for his
234
arrest.” The officers’ failure to administer Miranda warnings was not
deliberate, but rather an “oversight” that “may have been the result of
confusion as to whether the brief exchange qualified as ‘custodial
235
interrogation’ . . . .” The Elstad Court was careful to limit the scope of its
holding by noting “that, absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in
obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an
236
unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion.”
Indeed, the Court rejected as unfounded Justice Brennan’s concern that
the Court’s opinion served to validate question-first interrogation tactics.
Brennan’s criticism, the majority wrote, “distorts the reasoning and
holding of our decision, but, worse, invites trial courts and prosecutors to
237
do the same.”
In Seibert, Justice Kennedy began his enigmatic concurrence by
noting that the “scope of the Miranda suppression remedy depends . . .
on whether admission of the evidence under the circumstances would
238
frustrate Miranda’s central concerns and objectives.” He understood
Miranda’s goals to be deterrence of police misconduct and assurance of
239
the reliability of confessions. Accordingly, there is some reason to
believe Justice Kennedy’s primary concern was differentiating
240
unintentional Miranda violations from intentional ones.
But, Justice Kennedy disregarded the plurality’s invocation of an
objective test that would have treated all violations of Miranda similarly.
Instead, he endorsed a “narrower test applicable only in the infrequent
case . . . in which the two-step interrogation technique was used in a
241
calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.” The government,
therefore, argued that Seibert was irrelevant where the purpose of the
unwarned interrogation was to gather intelligence information, not
242
statements admissible for prosecution. Such an argument is at least
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s view that the Seibert technique was
233. Id. at 315.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 315–16.
236. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 318 n.5.
238. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 619 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 619, 620 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308).
241. Id. at 622.
242. Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum by the Government, supra note 224, at 6 (“[A]n initial unMirandized interrogation of the defendant by United States Government officials on Dec. 31, 2009,
followed by Mirandized interviews, was not a deliberate effort to undermine or weaken the Miranda
warnings later provided to the defendant, within the meaning of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004),
and therefore the Mirandized statements are admissible.”).
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problematic because it did not “serve any legitimate objectives that
243
might otherwise justify its use.” One could readily argue, as the
government did, that intelligence gathering is a “legitimate objective.”
The foregoing discussion is merely intended to highlight another
method the government has used to circumvent Miranda in the terrorism
context. Unlike the other techniques discussed herein, two-step
interrogations have yet to receive judicial sanction. But, given Justice
Kennedy’s ambiguous concurrence, it may not be too long before Article
III courts give their judicial blessing.
Conclusion
This Article serves as a wake-up call to those who sing the praises of
Article III courts. If commentators continue to focus on those courts’
virtues, without considering their vices, we are doomed to witness
profound changes to our criminal procedure law, not just for terrorists,
but for all persons charged with criminal offenses.
Government lawyers have spent much of the last decade developing
methods to circumvent Mirandadeferring to foreign governments,
devising two-step interrogation techniques, and expanding the public
safety exception. Opinions written by conservative judges hostile to
Miranda’s theory of custodial interrogations have provided them with
the ammunition to accomplish this task. The project may be too far
underway to reverse the tide. But all hope is not lost. We have endured
darker periods in our history only to emerge as a stronger and wiser
nation. Let us hope that the current administration’s commitment to
ending incommunicado detention and trying terrorism suspects in Article
III courts is real and immediate. But let us also hope that a few judges of
sturdy character will have the courage to stand up for what the
Constitution demands.

243. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621.

